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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
party in interest, although useful at trial, is inappropriate at the pretrial
level, particularly when, as with automobile coverage, the requirements
of compulsory insurance are generally known. The CPLR should be
amended to expressly authorize discovery of insurance policies.
ARTICLE 32- AccELTRAmD JUDGMENT
Collateral Estoppel: A misapplication.
Donato v. Cataffo'80 was an automobile accident case involving the
owner and the driver of one car and the owner and the driver of an-
other car. Both defendants moved for summary judgment, and the plain-
tiff-owner cross-moved for summary judgment. Prior to this action, a
passenger in the plaintiff-owner's vehicle had obtained judgment against
all the parties hereto. The absentee plaintiff-owner had not acquiesced
in the use of his vehicle for any business reason. The plaintiff-owner
contended that the decisive case was Mills v. Gabriel,131 which held
that a driver's negligence is not imputable to an absentee owner when
he attempts to recover his own damages. The defendants argued that
the plaintiff-owner was collaterally estopped under the previous ac-
tion.132 They relied on Schwartz v. Public Administrator of Bronx
County,133 which established two prerequisites to invocation of
collateral estoppel: (1) an identity of issue necessarily decided previ-
ously, and (2) a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior decision. 1' 4
The Donato court chose to apply the collateral estoppel theory. 3 5
In so doing, the court erred. The Schwartz case, which involved a suit
between two operators, was not in point, for Donato was an action by
an owner whose liability was wholly different from that of the driver
of policy limits, will resolve the issue for them. If a case is evaluated below the
policy limits, no problem arises. If it is serious enough to call for an evaluation
above the limits, in practice it would generally be settled within such limits, if'the
plaintiff knows what they are. Only in rare instances will a plaintiff persist in a
demand above policy limits, even if his injuries call for a possible recovery in
excess thereof. What's the use of incurring the expenses of a trial, and losing
valuable time, if a judgment in excess of the limits is uncollectible?
Jenkins, Discovery of Automobile Liability Insurance Limits: Quillets of the Law, 14 KAN.
L. REv. 59, 78-79 (1965).
130 69 Misc. 2d 705, 330 N.YS.2d 536 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1972).
131 259 App. Div. 60, 18 N.Y.S.2d 78 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 284 N.Y. 755, 81 N.E,2d 512
(1940).
132 For a thorough discussion of collateral estoppel, see Rosenberg, Collateral Estoppel
in New York, 44 ST. JoHN's L. Rnv. 165 (1969).
133 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E2.d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 44 ST. JoHn's L. REV. 136, 153 (1969).
184 Id. at 71, 246 N.E.2d at 728, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 959. As to which parties are bound
by prior judgments and affected by collateral estoppel, see 5 WK&M 5011.32-.37.
See also H. WAcnEaLL, NEW YoRK ParAca UNDaE rM CPLR 350-52 (3d ed. 1970).
135 69 Misc. 2d at 707-08, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 589-40.
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in Schwartz. The Mills case should have been deemed controlling. As
the Court of Appeals stated in Molino v. County of Putnam:3
The statute which imputes to an absentee owner the negligence of
his driver, for the purpose of imposing liability to an injured third
party, does not impute contributory negligence to such an absentee
owner in his action to recover his own damage.
There was no indication in Schwartz that Mills was overruled. It
is apparent that the plaintiff-owner was entitled to litigate the defen-
dants' responsibility for the property damage to his car. The plaintiff-
owner's own negligence was not in issue in the first action, so there was
no basis upon which he could be collaterally estopped in this action.
Indeed, the plaintiff-owner should have been granted summary judg-
ment, since the prior action established the defendants' negligence and
since there was no basis for finding that the plaintiff-owner was con-
tributorily negligent.
ARTicLE 41 - TRIAL BY A JURY
CPLR art. 41: Verdicts modified by court where jury failed to render
verdicts required by its own findings.
Welborn v. DeLeonardiI37 joined three separate negligence actions
based on the alleged negligent operation of two motor vehicles. In
action one, plaintiff 1 (P1), a passenger in the car owned and operated
by defendant 1 (D1), sued D1, D2, the lessor-owner of the other vehicle,
and D3, its lessee-operator. By verdict, P1 recovered against Dl. In ac-
tion two, in which DI sued D2 and D3, there was a hung jury. In action
three, P3, a passenger in the vehicle owned by D2 and operated by D3,
sued Dl, D2, and D3. A verdict was returned in that action in favor of
P3 against D2.
Thereafter, pursuant to CPLR 4404(a),138 motions were made to
set aside the jury's verdicts and for a new trial in actions one and three
because of the inconsistency of the verdicts. P 1 also moved for a directed
verdict in action one against D2 and D3 because of the jury's finding of
negligence in action three. In addition, D2 moved for judgment against
Dl in action two on the basis of (1) the verdict rendered in action three,
and (2) D l's motion for a new trial in actions one and three.
136 29 N.Y.2d 44, 49, 272 N.E.2d 323, 325, 323 N.Y.S.2d 817, 821 (1971), discussed in
The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. R a. 355, 374 (1971).
137 68 Misc. 2d 853, 328 N.Y.S.2d 132 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).
138 CPLR 4404(a) states that after a jury trial, a party or the court itself may move
to set aside a verdict or order a new trial where (1) the interests of justice so dictate; (2)
the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence; or (3) the jury cannot agree after
deliberating for a reasonable time.
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